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NOTES AND COMMENT
instances, 49 the courts are reluctant to allow the wife to sue for its
loss since the danger that is presented to the relationship is not so
great that negligent defendants should have the burden of paying ex-
cessive damages for the loss of something which is assumed by a jury.
The injustice, however, of summarily dismissing a complaint on the
ground that there is no authority to sustain it,50 is manifested by such
a situation as found in Hipp v. Dupont. The confusion arises from
the failure of the courts to uniformly examine the facts of these cases
to determine factually what the extent of the loss is and whether dam-
ages are recoverable .without making a farce of our trial system.
Public policy, as expressed in New York, has been to limit recovery
by the husband for loss of his wife's consortium 51 and to require him
to give proof of the value of his wife's services and the expenses to
which he was put.52 The danger of recovering excessive damages for
sentimental elements, the loss of which is assumed, having been re-
duced to a minimum there is absolutely no reason why the wife should
not be given her full, equal rights in the courts.
BERNARD SCHIFF.
FOREIGN LEGATEES AND DISTRIBUTEES UNDER SECTION 269 OF THE
SURROGATE'S COURT ACT.
"Where it shall appear that a legatee, distributee or beneficiary of
a trust would not have the benefit or use or control of the money or
other property due him, or where other special circumstances make it
appear desirable that such payment be withheld, the decree may direct
that such money or other property be paid into the Surrogate's court
for the benefit of such legatee, distributee, beneficiary of a trust or
such person or persons who may thereafter appear to be entitled
thereto * * *."
This is the 1939 addition to Section 269 of the Surrogate's Court
Act.' Appended to it was the following bill note: " * * * The pur-
pose of the amendment is to authorize the deposit of monies or prop-
erty in the Surrogate's Court in cases where transmission or payment
to a beneficiary, legatee, or other person resident in a foreign country
40 Colwell v. Tinker, 169 N. Y. 531, 536, 62 N. E. 668, 670 (1902), supra
note 11.GO Maloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 608 (1938), supra
note 44.51 N. Y. WORxMEN'S CoMPENsATIoN LAW § 11; Swan v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., 129 Misc. 500, 222 N. Y. Supp. 111 (1927) (no recovery by a husband for
loss of his wife's services, when she is injured in the course of her employment
and has received compensation under Workmen's Compensation Law).
52 Schaupp v. Turner, 188 App. Div. 338, 177 N. Y. Supp. 132 (3d Dept.
1919), supra note 39.
2 N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 343, in effect April 24, 1939.
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might be circumvented by confiscation in whole or in part * * *."
This bill note must be considered in any interpretation of the statute.2
In other words, where a non-resident alien becomes entitled to
money or property from the estate of a decedent, and it is "contin-
gently possible" 3 that such money or property would be subject to
confiscation by his government in whole or in part if transmitted to
him through the usual channels, the surrogate, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, may direct that the money or property be paid into
court.
It is obvious that this statute was to a certain extent aimed par-
ticularly at certain confiscatory practices of the totalitarian states.4
Confiscation changes its color and form to meet various situations, all
under the guise of legal process. First, outright and allegedly forth-
right confiscation, used when the recipient belongs to a certain race or
holds certain religious or political beliefs contrary to the national
philosophy. 5  Secondly, the imposition of excessive taxes.6  Thirdly,
payment to the recipient in debased coinage or paper money.7
Thus, Mr. American Resident would die with the belief that all
his worldly possessions would go to his friends and relatives in the
old country, whereas, in fact, they would receive nothing. This situa-
tion demanded a remedy, and the executive committee of the Surro-
gate's Association of the State of New York proposed the amendment
to Section 269 of the Surrogate's Court Act.
At about the same time, companion pieces of legislation were
passed. Section 51a of the Civil Practice Act 8 is a short statute of
limitations which cuts off adverse claims for money against resident
debtors and stakeholders. Sections 287a-287e of the Civil Practice
Act 9 govern actions to determine adverse claims to specific personal
property. Section 474 of the Civil Practice Act 10 declares that where
a person is entitled to a judgment for money or other personal prop-
erty, and it appears that he would not have the "benefit or use or
control" of the money or property, it may be paid into court for his
2 Matter of Weidberg, 172 Misc. 525, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 252 (1939), citing
American Historical Soc. v. Glenn, 248 N. Y. 445, 162 N. E. 481 (1928) and
People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395, 108 N. E. 639 (1915) ; Matter of
Bold, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 15, 1940, p. 721, col. 2.
3 In Matter of Weidberg, 172 Misc. 525, 528, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 252, 257
(1939), the word "might" is defined as "to be contingently possible".
4 "The provision is obviously directed at the so-called totalitarian nations,
and primarily at Germany. It is a re-affirmation of faith in democratic prin-
ciples." HARRIs, EsTATEs PRACTICE GUIDE (1939) § 724.
5 Matter of Weidberg, 172 Misc. 525, 527, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 252, 256
(1939) ; Matter of Bold, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 15, 1940, p. 721, col. 2.
6 Ibid.; Ed., N. Y. L. J., Nov. 17, 18, 1939; Ed., N. Y. L. J., Sept. 21,
1939.
7 See notes 5 and 6, supra.
8 N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 805, in effect June 8. This section is discussed and
analyzed in Legis. (1939) 14 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 221.
9 N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 804, in effect June 8.
"0 N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 672, in effect June 2.
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benefit. Section 978 of the Civil Practice Act 1 ' grants a similar rem-
edy in cases where one party has money or personal property in his
possession which is due to another party and it appears that such
other party will not have the "benefit or use or control" of such money
or property. The latter two sections were designed primarily to
prevent confiscation by the foreign government.12 Sections 51a and
287a-287e were designed to remedy the effects of confiscation already
consummated by the foreign government.13 Thus, the foreigner en-
titled to money or personal property situated in this state is well pro-
tected from confiscation.
We have seen the motivating causes of the statute. From these,
it is fairly easy to determine its purpose. The primary purpose, of
course, is to effectuate the express wishes of the testator or the implied
wishes of the intestate. 14 This is the ground which justifies the inter-
vention of the surrogates, and which grants jurisdiction to the state to
legislate in the matter.15 Also underlying the statute was a desire to
aid the foreign legatee or distributee.1' As the statute expressly
states, the money is to be held for the benefit of the legatee or dis-
tributee until such time as it shall appear that he shall be the sole
beneficiary of the money. As an afterthought, a third purpose devel-
oped. That was to prevent the use of the money to advance un-
American doctrines, or "to undermine our institutions and to sabotage
our industries." 17
A determination of its effect at this time must, necessarily, be
incomplete. It is still a very young statute and the proper historical
perspective has not yet been attained from which it can be evaluated
with any degree of certainty.
Power of Attorney.
In most of the cases that have arisen under the statute,' 8 a rep-
"' Ibid.
12 It will be noted that the language used in N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 474
and 978 is similar to that used in N. Y. SuRaROATE's COURT Ac § 269, and
almost identical bill notes were appended to all three.
13 Assume that an American holds money or property belonging to a
Czechoslovakian business man. When Germany conquered that country it con-
fiscated the claim. In order to protect himself from double liability, the Ameri-
can debtor may interplead both claimants. See Legis. (1939) 14 ST. JOHN's L.
REv. 221.
14 The distribution of the estate of an intestate has been called a "statutory
will". Matter of Weidberg, 172 Misc. 525, 528, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 252, 256
(1939), citing Matter of Williams, 162 Misc. 507, 295 N. Y. Supp. 56, aff'd,
254 App. Div. 741, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 467 (2d Dept. 1937).
1s Wills and estates have always been exclusively in the jurisdiction of the
state. U. S. CONsT. Amend. X.
16 Ed., N. Y. L. J., Sept. 21, 1939.
'1 Matter of Landau, 172 Misc. 651, 653, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 3, 6 (1939).
18 The cases under the statute, to date, are:
German: Matter of Weidberg, 172 Misc. 525, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 252 (1939)
(Kings, Surrogate Wingate); Matter of Ohly, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 18, 1939, p.
1940 I
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resentative of the foreign government has appeared with a power of
attorney signed by the foreign legatee or distributee. "An inevitable
implied term of this, and every other, power of attorney is that it
confers upon the donee only such authority as may be permissible of
exercise under the laws of the place in which action thereunder is
contemplated." 19 Since Section 269 of the Surrogate's Court Act is
law in New York, a power of attorney is subordinate and subject to
it. Therefore, if the conditions described in the statute are proven to
the satisfaction of the surrogate, he may refuse to deliver the money
to the attorney in fact.
In Matter of Landau 20 and Matter of Bold,21 the distributees
were Russian citizens, and were represented here by an attorney in
fact. In the former case, Surrogate Wingate took judicial notice of
the fact that private ownership of property has been abolished by the
Soviet government and, therefore, the distributive share would be
confiscated in its entirety. In the Bold case, Surrogate Foley,
although refusing to accept the contention that there was a limited
form of private ownership of personal property under the new Soviet
constitution, preferred to base his decision on the fact that even if the
share were remitted to the distributee, he would be paid in Russian
rubles, and would receive but a minute fraction of his share.22  Re-
gardless of the reasoning, there can be no doubt that Section 269 of
the Surrogate's Court Act applies to legatees and distributees residing
in Soviet Russia.
1695, col. 5 (New York, Surrogate Foley); Matter of Kyriss, N. Y. L. J.,
Dec. 8, 1939, p. 2034, col. 3 (New York, Surrogate Foley); Matter of Lex,
N. Y. L. J., Jan. 29, 1940, p. 462, col. 2 (Kings, Surrogate Wingate) ; Matter
of Mintz, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 10, 1940, p. 665, col. 4 (New York, Surrogate
Foley) ; only in the Weidberg and Mintz cases did the surrogate impound the
money.
Russian: Matter of Landau, 172 Misc. 651, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 3 (1939)
(Kings, Surrogate Wingate); Matter of Bold, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 15, 1940, p.
721, col. 2 (New York, Surrogate Foley); in both cases the money was
impounded.
Polish: Matter of Steiner, 172 Misc. 950, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 613 (1939)
(Bronx, Surrogate Henderson); Matter of-Kamioner, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 16,
1940, p. 739, col. 4 (New York, Surrogate Foley); Matter of Rosilinsky,
N. Y. L. J., Mar. 6, 1940, p. 1046, col. 4 (Kings, Surrogate Wingate); in each
case the money was paid into court.
Italian: Matter of Blasi, 172 Misc. 587, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 682 (1939)
(Kings, Surrogate Wingate) ; Matter of Grosso, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 8, 1939, p.
2043, col. 4 (Kings, Surrogate Wingate) ; in both cases the money was given to
the Italian consul.
19 Matter of Weidberg, 172 Misc. 524, 531, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 252, 259
(1939).
20 172 Misc. 651, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 3 (1939).
21 N. Y. L. J., Feb. 15, 1940, p. 721, col. 2.
22 According to the testimony of an expert witness on Russian exchange
rates, the distributee would -eceive only $30 out of his distributive share of$1,500. An expert for the attorney in fact testified that he would be paid one
fifth in American dollars. But even that would amount to a confiscation of
$1,200 out of $1,500.
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In Matter of Weidberg,23 the distributees were four Jewish sub-
jects of Germany who had left the country, one now residing in Den-
mark, one in Belgium, and two in Palestine. The German consul and
his two legal attorneys appeared with a power of attorney. Surro-
gate Wingate took judicial notice of the $400,000,000 fine levied on
the Jewish people by the German government, and also of the fact that
it had not as yet been paid in full. These were sufficient "special
circumstances" to justify the surrogate in retaining the money. There-
fore, Section 269 of the Surrogate's Court Act apparently applies to
Jewish legatees and distributees residing in Germany, unless there is
some other rule of law which prevents the statute from going into
operation.
Treaty.
The United States Constitution, the treaties between the United
States and other nations, and the laws of Congress are the supreme
law of the land.24 There is little doubt that the statute is constitu-
tional and we have already seen that the New York State Legislature
had jurisdiction to enact it.25 But the statute is still subordinate to
any inconsistent provision in a treaty.2 8  In the treaty between the
United States and Germany 27 is found this clause: "A consular officer
of either High Contracting Party may in behalf of his non-resident
countrymen receipt for their distributive shares derived from estates
in process of probate * * *, provided he remit any funds so received
through the appropriate agencies of his Government to the proper
distributees, and provided further that he furnish to the authority or
agency making distribution through him reasonable evidence of such
remission." 28 This same provision is in force between the United
States and many other nations, by reason of "most favored nation"
clauses.29 Is this treaty provision inconsistent with the 1939 amend-
ment to Section 269 of the Surrogate's Court Act?
In Matter of Weidberg, one of the four German-Jewish distribu-
tees was an infant now residing in Palestine, a British protectorate.
Surrogate Wingate held that since Germany and Great Britain were
at war, and since it was manifestly impossible for the German govern-
ment to remit the funds to him "through the appropriate agencies of
his Government", there was no conflict between the treaty and the
statute. He did not, however, consider the treaty in relation to the
23 172 Misc. 524, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 252 (1939).
24 U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 2.
25 See note 15, supra.
28 "The public policy of one of the states must yield to an international
treaty or compact to which the United States is a party." 6 WiLLIsTo, CON-
TRAcTs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 1792.
27 Treaty of Dec. 8, 1923, 44 STAT. 2132 (1923).
28 Id. Art. 25, p. 2154.
29 The "most favored nation" clause is found in Article 17 of the treaty
with Italy, May 8, 1878, 20 STAT. 725, 732 (1878).
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other distributees who had escaped from Germany, for it appears that
the German consul claimed to represent them only through the power
of attorney.
If the consul had claimed under the treaty, could the surrogate
have withheld the money, or would he have been compelled to pay it
to the consul? This question is fraught with difficulty. While the
courts have the power to interpret treaties,30 they have no power to
violate them, or to modify or repudiate them. The courts have no
power to refuse to enforce a provision of a treaty between the United
States and a foreign government on the ground that the foreign gov-
ernment has itself violated the provision.31 That is a political ques-
tion solely in the jurisdiction of the executive and legislative branches
of the Federal Government.32  Since neither the President, the State
Department nor Congress has as yet spoken on the subject, the treaty
provision must be considered as valid and controlling as far as the
judiciary is concerned.
Assignment.
Another interesting problem presents itself. Assume that, instead
of appearing under a power of attorney or under the treaty, the rep-
resentative of the German government appeared with an assignment of
the share from the distributee, which assignment was completely valid
on its face. The average layman, who reads his daily paper and is
reasonably conversant with current European events, would imme-
diately say that it could not have been the voluntary act of the Jewish
distributee. This, undoubtedly, would be true, and the man would be
justified in his conclusion. Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, the
law is not thus easily satisfied. Rules of evidence would make it very
difficult to prove in a court of law that this assignment was procured
through duress. Of course, if the signature was forged, it might not
be difficult to prove that fact. But dictators do not work that way.
So we will assume that the signature was actually that of the distribu-
tee. If it were procured through duress, there certainly will have been
no third persons conveniently present to witness the transaction. The
distributee himself is still living, but "somewhere in Europe", although
it might be doubted whether the presumption of continuance of exis-
tence in the war-torn Old World carries much weight.33 However,
he is unavailable as a witness. The burden of proving duress is on
the party who asserts it.
34
30 The rules of statutory construction apply. Hamilton v. Erie R. R., 219
N. Y. 343, 114 N. E. 399 (1916).
31 See DEVLIN, TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1908) §§96, 97.
32 U. S. CONsT. Art. II, § 2, par. 2.
33 Surrogate Wingate, in Matter of Weidberg, 172 Misc. 524, 530, 15 N. Y.
S. (2d) 252, 258 (1939) : "In a war-torn Europe, the weight of the inference
of continuance of existence becomes negligible."
3' 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1939) § 1626.
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Other Nations.
We have seen the statute as it applies to Nazi Germany and
Soviet Russia. Now let us see how it affects other nations. In
Matter of Blasi,35 the Italian consul appeared under the treaty between
the United States and Italy,3 6 claiming to represent a distributee resi-
dent in Italy. Surrogate Wingate there said: "No intimation has
been made in the present case, and there is nothing of which the court
may take judicial notice, to indicate that if the net distributable assets
of this estate were paid to the Italian consul, pursuant to his authority
of receipt, the sum would not be capable of transmission, and in fact,
be remitted to the distributees in Italy." 37 This case indicates and
emphasizes that something more than mere power to confiscate is
necessary to call Section 269 of the Surrogate's Court Act into play.
Italy, being a totalitarian state, had the power to confiscate the dis-
tributive share. But there must also be shown the inclination to exer-
cise that power. That inclination was shown in regard to Germany
and Russia, but not in regard to Italy.
In respect to distributees situated in the late country of Poland,
there can be little doubt that the surrogate has not only the power but
the duty to pay any money into court,38 at least until the outside world
is able to get an accurate picture of what is happening in that country.
It would be impossible for the defunct Polish government to transmit
the funds,39 and the German government would have no treaty right
to the funds, since the Poles are not their countrymen. Germany's
conquest of Poland has not received recognition from the United States
government. The same reasoning applies to both Austria and Czecho-
slovakia, and to such minor sections as Memel and Danzig. However,
if, under a power of attorney, the attorney in fact proves that the
proper beneficiaries will receive the money, then the surrogate may
release the money.
In respect to other totalitarian states, such as Spain and some of
the South American nations, the same rule would seem to apply as
that applied to Italy. The special circumstances which would deprive
the beneficiary of the use of the money or property would have to be
proven to the satisfaction of the surrogate. If the legatee or distribu-
tee is a gentile, the mere fact that he resides in Germany will not
occasion the surrogate to impound the money. 40
It is improbable that the statute will ever be invoked against a.
democracy, for the reason that it is improbable that a democracy will
attempt to confiscate illegally money due to one of its citizens. How-
35 172 Misc. 587, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 682 (1939).
36 See note 29, supra.
3 172 Misc. 589, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 684.
38 See note 18, supra.
39 Matter of Steiner, 172 Misc. 950, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 613 (1939).
40 Matter of Ohly, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 18, 1939, p. 1695, col. 5; Matter of
Kyriss, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 8, 1939, p. 2034, col. 3; Matter of Lex, N. Y. L. J.,
Jan. 29, 1940, p. 462, col. 2.
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ever, if such an attempt were made, the statute would be just as effec-
tive against a democracy as against a dictatorship.
Payment into Court.
The last sentence of Section 269 of the Surrogate's Court Act is
as follows: "Such money or other property so paid into court shall be
paid out only by the special order of the surrogate or pursuant to the
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction." In Matter of Weid-
berg,41 after the money due to the four German-Jewish refugees had
been paid into court, the German consul retired from the case, and the
other two attorneys in fact communicated with the distributees in their
new countries. The attorneys received cables and letters from each in
return requesting the attorneys to collect and remit the money to them
by check. These the attorneys filed in the Surrogate's Court along
with affidavits swearing that the distributees would actually receive
the money. Relying on these, Surrogate Wingate released the money
to the attorneys in fact.
42
This is one illustration of what might happen to the money after
it has been paid into court. If such proof had not been filed, however,
the money might have stayed in the city treasury bearing interest
indefinitely. It would remain there so long as it appeared that the
distributee or his heirs would not receive the money, so long as the
threat of confiscation existed. By the time that threat disappeared, it
might be impossible to trace the distributee or his heirs. The money
would then revert to the heirs of the decedent. But his kin may have
disappeared by this time. In such a case, the money would escheat
to the state.
Conclusion.
The 1939 amendment to Section 269 of the Surrogate's Court
Act was designed to prevent confiscation by a foreign government.
This purpose has been accomplished satisfactorily in the cases which
have applied the statute. In regard to Russia, Poland, Austria, and
Czechoslovakia, there seems to be little doubt that the statute is appli-
cable. In respect to Italy and other totalitarian states, outsides of
Germany, it must be definitely proven that the money will be wrong-
fully confiscated by the government before the surrogate will apply
the statute.
It is only where Germany is concerned that the problem becomes
difficult. Where the representative of the German government claims
the distributive share of a Jewish subject under a power of attorney,
the money will be withheld. If the German consul claims such a
41 172 Misc. 524, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 252 (1939).
42 He withheld the infant's share, however, since the power of attorney was
not valid as to him. Foley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 333, 34 N. E.
211 (1893).
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share under the treaty, it is doubtful whether the surrogate has the
right to impound the money. If the German representative appears
with an assignment, valid on its face, it is doubtful whether the surro-
gate would be legally justified in retaining the money.
The statute, of course, is not restricted to dictatorship. It may
also apply to democracies or to any other form of government, as long
as the conditions prescribed by the statute appear.
ROBERT B. F. GILLESPIE.
DUAL JOB HOLDING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM.
Although statutory and common law interdictions against the
holding of multiple public positions have long been an accepted part
of our jurisprudence, it was only recently that such limitations were
extended to inctmbents in the public school system.
For some time the Board of Education has sought to limit teach-
ers to one position, but it has, to a large extent, been frustrated by the
tenure statutes.' These laws provide that a person, who has secured
tenure thereunder, may not be removed except for cause, after hear-
ing, and by the vote of a majority of the Board.2 What constitutes
good and sufficient cause has been the subject of much controversy.$
I In Hughes v. Board of Education of City of New York, 249 App. Div.
158, 291 N. Y. Supp. 462 (1st Dept. 1936), the board of education sought to
remove the principal of an evening school after he had secured tenure, during
his good behavior and competent service and while night school was being
maintained, simply because he held the position of principal of a night school.
In reversing the removal the court said that the board had power to grant the
permanent tenure, and having done so it could not remove the petitioner except
for cause, after hearing and by the vote of a majority of the board. A similar
result was reached in Matter of Cohen v. Board of Education, 163 Misc. 638,
296 N. Y. Supp. 522, aft'd, 277 N. Y. 519, 13 N. E. 454 (1938).2 N. Y. ED. LAW § 872, subd. 3: "* * * Such person and all others employed
in the teaching, examining or supervising service of the school of a city, who
have served the full probationary period, or have rendered satisfactorily an
equivalent period of service prior to the time this act goes into effect shall hold
their respective positions during good behavior and efficient and competent
service, and shall not be removed except for cause after hearing, by the affirma-
tive vote of a majority of the board."
3 See Cooke v. Dodge, 164 Misc. 78, 82, 299 N. Y. Supp. 257, 262 (1937),
where the court laid down the following rule: "The cause assigned must be
substantial and not shadowy, and that the explanation must be received and
acted upon in good faith and not arbitrarily. To be substantial the cause
assigned must be some dereliction on the part of the subordinate, or neglect of
duty, or something affecting his character or fitness for the position." The
difficulties in applying this rule are obvious.
In Matter of Thomas, 33 N. Y. St. Dept. Rep. 12 (1925), it was held that
the removal of a teacher pursuant to a rule that a teacher's place should become
vacant on her marriage was improper. Cf. Matter of Weeks, 4 N. Y. St.
Dept. Rep. 605 (1915), where it was held that the absence of a married teacher
1940 ]
